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of state authority since the 1990s. However, 
these reforms have rarely been successful in the 
long run. Studies of reform efforts offer a range 
of explanations for these disappointing results, 
including: reform efforts taking a top-down 
approach or being too donor-driven; approaches 
offering technical solutions to fundamentally 
political problems; programmes lacking legitimacy 
at the local level or missing buy-in at the national 
level; and a lack of state capacity for large-scale 
reform.1
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 
in the wake of the Second Congo War (1998–2003), 
police reform has been a staple of statebuilding and 
governance strengthening efforts.2 Despite some 
reform successes, however, the Police Nationale 
Congolaise (PNC, Congolese National Police) 
largely remains a reflection of the state. It is mostly 
unaccountable to those it is meant to serve, and 
used as a tool by some to extract resources and 
protect elite interests.3
As a key state institution, sustainable reform of 
the police is impossible without a considerable 
overhaul of the larger governance framework of 
which it is part. While acknowledging this major 
systemic challenge, there may nevertheless be 
some more modest, yet impactful, gains to be made 
through police reform. By focusing on the everyday 
work and life of police personnel, future reforms 
could contribute to changing police behaviour on 
the streets and in police stations, at the interface 
between the police and the population where it 
may arguably matter most. 
In the minds of most police officers, there are three 
interconnected aspects shaping their everyday 
work: their working and living conditions, and 
their perceived value in society. The question of 
salary links all three. Officers see their insufficient 
or lacking salaries as the root of their struggle for 
survival, as a justification for their harassment 
of civilians, and as undermining the respect they 
ought to command.4 In the words of a police 
officer: 
If I am not creative and neglect myself, nobody can 
respect me. But if … we are given uniforms, we 
work in the street and we are clean, and have a 
good salary, at the end of the month, nobody can 
ignore us.5
These observations illustrate the need to listen to 
the experiences, worries and concerns of ordinary 
policewomen and men bearing the brunt of daily 
police work, which can be used as a starting 
point for reform efforts. Based on seven months 
of qualitative research on the PNC conducted in 
Bukavu between 2016 and 2017, this briefing argues 
that targeted police reforms, informed and driven 
by local actors, can affect change, and often in a 
more sustainable—and financially viable—fashion 
than past large-scale donor-driven reform support 
programmes.
Contextualizing the police in the DRC6
To better understand the police’s everyday working 
and living conditions, it is key to examine the 
historical and political context of policing in the 
DRC. From the days of the Congo Free State (1885–
1908), state security forces have had a troubled 
relationship with society. They are recurrently 
involved in violent oppression, abuse and theft. 
The roots of this difficult relationship can be traced 
back to the oppressive nature of the Congo’s 
governments from Belgian King Léopold II up to 
today. The state’s coercive arm, the army and the 
police, has served to facilitate this oppression.7 
The Congo’s socio-economic decline since the 
mid-1970s and its impact on the functioning of 
state institutions has compounded this trend, 
eroding state income and prompting the rise of a 
large informal economy. Cash-strapped, President 
Mobutu told his security forces, ‘débrouillez-vous 
pour vivre’ (‘sort yourselves out to stay alive’), 
effectively instructing them to live off the 
population—now referred to tongue-in-cheek as 
the non-existent Article 15 of the Constitution.8 
A final factor making this relationship difficult 
is the logic of patronage that permeates all 
Congolese state institutions, if to different degrees. 
Their employees double as patrons and seek to 
grant their clients access to revenue-generating 
opportunities in return for loyalty and a share 
of the resources. As a result, state institutions 
have become rent-producing structures, where 
public resources and positions are used for private 
purposes.9 
Today, these neo-patrimonial logics endure in 
most resource-deprived state institutions, and the 
police are no exception. Coupled with a history of 
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oppression and impunity in a permissive climate, 
this system of governance incentivizes the police 
to engage daily in widespread harassment of the 
population to extract revenue. Such practices, 
although far from socially accepted—and besides 
defending entrenched elite interests—are situated 
in a long tradition of informal survival strategies 
of both decaying state institutions and their 
employees.10
A variety of these revenue-generating practices 
exist. Probably the best known is a phenomenon 
called rapportage (‘reporting’). Police officers 
are expected to make weekly payments to their 
superiors, who in turn pay their superiors, allowing 
the money to flow up the hierarchy. For junior 
officers, the most common way to gather the 
funds for their ‘financial report’ is to harass the 
population. As one police officer explains, ‘working 
is harassing’.11 Unsurprisingly, the population at 
large, as well as most police officers, condemn this 
informal taxation. But for the latter, a pressing 
need to supplement their income to make ends 
meet, and the threat of being rotated to less 
lucrative posts, detained or being dismissed if they 
fail to ‘report’, overrides moral objections.
The reasons for police behaviour and their 
interactions with citizens are more complex, 
however, and are not just predetermined by 
these structural conditions. Both individual 
police personnel and citizens have the agency to 
shape their own behaviour. Civilians pay fees to 
avoid further harassment, but also to maintain 
the provision of security as an essential public 
service. In this sense, civilians reproduce—and 
indeed become very much part of—the way state 
institutions function.12 
For police, rapportage, together with these 
voluntary contributions and less aggressive 
revenue-generating mechanisms, is crucial to 
keep the institution afloat. At the police station, 
for instance, citizens are asked to pay fees to 
cover the cost of stationery and fuel. Outside the 
station, police tax drivers and road-side market 
stall operators. At the same time, satisfied citizens 
sometimes remunerate police voluntarily, or 
because they are friends or family. One commander 
specifically advises his troops not to request 
money. ‘If you talk well to people, if they listen, 
they will give something.’13 Such practices ensure 
the continuous functioning of the police service. 
Yet, few police reform support programmes have 
taken this dimension into consideration.
Reform sustainability: The case of the 
SSAPR programme 
One of the most ambitious police reform initiatives 
implemented in the DRC to date is the GBP 
60 million Security Sector Accountability and 
Police Reform (SSAPR) programme, launched in 
2009 by the UK’s Department for International 
Development (DFID). The SSAPR’s aim was to 
turn the Congolese police force into a Police de 
Proximité (PdP, Proximity Police Force),14 a police 
philosophy and working strategy emphasizing 
police–community partnerships and accountability. 
Its considerable budget and focus on Bukavu as one 
of its three pilot sites make it a suitable case study 
to highlight certain challenges of sustainability 
in police reform. The SSAPR took a two-pronged 
approach, focusing both on the supply and 
demand sides of reform. It promoted institutional 
reform and capacity building at the highest level 
while simultaneously carrying out large popular 
sensitization campaigns and establishing meeting 
platforms between police, urban administrations 
and communities.15 
Despite its ambition and initial plans for a five-
year extension, the SSAPR programme came to 
a premature end. Operation Likofi in Kinshasa, 
a campaign of brutal repression of youth gangs 
by the capital’s police force in 2013 and 2014, 
provoked an international outcry over the PNC’s 
human rights abuses. Although the UK had never 
given any support to Kinshasa’s police forces, the 
programme shut down to the frustration of many, 
including DFID and SSAPR staff.16
From 2010 to its end in early 2015, the SSAPR 
programme achieved a number of successes. A 
series of laws and decrees governing the police 
were passed and over 1,500 police officers were 
trained in PdP principles across its three pilot 
cities. At least in Bukavu, these principles are still 
adhered to by some police officers.
Moreover, certain police–community meeting 
platforms created under the SSAPR continue to 
function today, albeit sporadically and ad hoc. 
These platforms, the Forums de Quartier (FQ, 
Neighbourhood Forum) at the neighbourhood level 
and the Comités Locaux pour la Sécurité de Proximité 
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(CLSP, Local Committees for Community Security) 
at the higher urban administrative level of commune, 
bring together police, administrators and civil 
society leaders to exchange and communicate on 
safety and security issues concerning their areas. 
Such meetings have improved general knowledge 
of police work, helped overcome long-standing 
distrust between the police and communities, 
fostered collaboration between them, and ensured 
a modicum of accountability. 
While these SSAPR initiatives have endured, 
others have not. Under the programme’s coaching 
system, for instance, trained police coaches 
provided mentoring for lower-level commanders 
and station chiefs to ensure that the spirit of the 
reform was maintained. Unfortunately, these 
coaches stopped receiving support for their 
activities once SSAPR ended.17 
The short-lived nature of some of the programme’s 
initiatives draws attention to one of the biggest 
weaknesses of donor-driven security sector 
reforms: their sustainability. There are several 
reasons for this. 
First, patronage structures which incentivize 
revenue generation and the cultivation of personal 
loyalties, hamper the progress of security sector 
reform, in particular towards community policing 
models. Police working for citizens, rather than 
extracting resources from them, threatens the flow 
of resources that keeps elites in power—both in 
the police and in government. Reformists should 
therefore be cautious of commitments made by 
the highest echelons of government and the police 
themselves to proximity policing models. 
Another reason why this policing model clashes 
with elite interests is that its democratic and 
preventative policing principles are at odds with 
the repressive force needed to maintain regime 
security. This tension reflects a wider problem 
with security sector reform. It threatens the very 
foundations of power of those responsible for 
implementing the reforms. 
The SSAPR highlights these two phenomena well. 
It became widely known over the course of the 
programme, for instance, that the six-month police 
training cycles offered three meals a day, per diems, 
and other benefits such as new uniforms and boots. 
The training itself thus became a source of rent 
for patronage. In many cases, candidate selection 
was based on personal connections rather than 
merit, seeing many officers enter the training who 
did not meet the minimum requirements. Some 
of them returned home as soon as the training 
ended, while others joined special police units such 
as the traffic police, the border police and rapid 
intervention units, which provide more lucrative 
revenue-generation opportunities. Still others went 
on to sell police equipment, often in connivance 
with commanders. Such practices further damaged 
the police force’s reputation and undermined the 
reform’s intended goals. 
A third factor undermining reform sustainability 
lies in the unequal spread of its benefits, creating 
differential interests in and commitments to 
reform implementation. Again, the SSAPR provides 
examples. Despite the programme’s two-pronged 
approach, the police hierarchy at the national, 
provincial and municipal levels were not exposed 
to the same intensive training programmes as the 
rank and file. Police commanders thus did not 
always see the boons of police reform as clearly 
as their subordinates. Indeed, some identified 
the reform and its promoters as a direct threat 
to their own interests. Unsurprisingly, many 
well-trained PdP police officers, including reform 
advocates, were rotated out of the pilot sites, or 
were overlooked for promotions and side-lined. A 
combination of patronage logic and varying degrees 
of buy-in from the police hierarchy ensured that 
the influence of those promoting the reform and 
its principles was weakened, while simultaneously 
eroding the core of the PdP-trained police force.
Finally, although SSAPR was a well-funded, long-
term reform programme, its five-year duration 
was insufficient to change the mentalities and 
operating logics of a complex state institution 
such as the police. This limited duration is 
typical of donor programmes. Tied to election 
cycles and legislative scrutiny at home, donors 
are often unable to guarantee long-term support 
for reform initiatives. SSAPR’s premature end, 
however, further compromised the sustainability 
of many of its reforms. Its wrap-up was rushed, 
causing widespread frustration and leaving many 
questions on the ground unanswered. Many of the 
programme’s successes quickly eroded and old, 
socially destructive habits of revenue generation 
returned. 
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While these structural constraints are difficult 
to overcome, external reform supporters could 
be more aware of the political economy of the 
police and how their intended reform initiatives 
may impact institutional incentives and hidden 
interests. This understanding could contain 
some of the negative consequences of reform and 
ensure a longer-term impact. Yet, in the Congo’s 
current political climate, marked by security forces’ 
growing repression against dissent, renewed large-
scale donor engagement with the security sector 
appears unlikely. Moreover, the privatization of 
development aid, coupled with the increasingly 
anti-aid sentiments in donor countries, has led to 
an increased scrutiny of aid budgets and a tendency 
to outsource risk to implementing partners. In 
this context, it is worth asking what more modest 
reform initiatives could be implemented to salvage 
some of the successes of previous initiatives and 
work towards more incremental reform, factoring 
in the impact at the street level.
Professional pride and everyday policing 
When asked what they themselves would focus on 
in future reform efforts, low-ranking Congolese 
police officers mention a range of priorities. They 
want a sufficient salary, suitable equipment, 
training, merit-based promotions, housing support, 
child and health care, pension, and help with 
food and transport. Underlying most of these 
material demands, however, is a strong feeling of 
abandonment by the state and a perceived lack of 
popular appreciation.18 
Across countries and cultures, performance 
at work is closely linked to feelings of pride 
and self-esteem, of contributing to and being 
valued by society.19 In conversations about what 
motivates policewomen and men, what drives 
them to do their work, pride and honour are 
recurring themes. The police uniform illustrates 
this well.20 The uniform is a marker of police 
identity, differentiating officers from the crowd. 
When police officers talk about their uniform, 
professional pride—and its importance for 
motivation and performance—becomes very 
tangible. Most associate wearing a uniform 
with patriotism. The uniform strengthens their 
confidence, gives them authority and makes them 
feel secure. In a group discussion, one police officer 
said: ‘According to me, a policeman in uniform 
represents the national emblem,’ while another 
added: ‘For me, it symbolizes my authority, honour 
and respect.’21 
Uniforms that are old, torn and dirty, however—
such as most of those worn by Congolese police—
become symbolic of the deplorable life and 
working conditions of the PNC. They represent 
an inadequate salary, long working hours, a lack 
of training and development, the bare offices 
and missing equipment, the absence of health 
and social benefits, miserable housing, and so 
on.22 Epitomizing police officers’ struggles and 
powerlessness, the uniform becomes a symbol of 
shame and a focus of popular mockery and disdain, 
undermining professional pride. One officer 
captured the tension between his wish to do police 
work and the profound disappointment about the 
realities of this work in the DRC as follows: 
In other countries … in European countries … or 
in African countries, is the police always facing the 
same conditions we do? Because ours are very bad. 
The police officer is a big man in other places, but 
here, we are nothing. If I had money, I could go to 
Europe to work for the police there. Here, there is 
no work, nobody respects the police. You have to 
carry a gun to be respected.23
Key factors shaping professional pride are 
someone’s work environment, social support 
amongst colleagues, inclusion in decision-making, 
personal and professional development, and 
societal image.24 All of these are deficient in the 
PNC. Their lack is not just a symptom of larger 
difficulties, but also a serious constraint on 
motivation and performance, and should therefore 
be taken seriously in reform processes.
This does not mean that restoring professional 
pride is a silver bullet for successful police 
reform. SSAPR shows how patronage logics and 
elite interests undermined the elements of the 
programme that targeted professional pride, such 
as the coaching system. Moreover, professional 
pride does not guarantee good behaviour. Factors 
such as formal and informal institutional norms, 
leadership and social cohesion also matter.25 
Nevertheless, improving the motivation of street-
level police officers can lead to changes in their 
behaviour, which in turn has a direct impact 
on how people experience their services. Police 
officers’ experiences and perspectives can therefore 
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serve as a valuable guide for shaping modest, 
feasible and high-impact future reform efforts, 
salvaging what large-scale reform programmes 
have left behind. 
Policy considerations: Everyday police 
life as a guide to reform
In the absence of complete overhaul of the larger 
governance framework, and with renewed large-
scale donor engagement with the security sector 
appearing unlikely, modest but targeted police 
reform support efforts can be sustainable—and 
financially viable—alternatives, particularly when 
driven by local actors and when building on the 
foundations of their larger predecessors.26 Both 
the legacies of past reform programmes, as well as 
certain formal institutions and informal practices 
within the PNC, provide a range of concrete entry 
points for such reforms.
Improving working conditions
A 2013 Congolese law regulates a range of aspects 
of police employment. It covers, amongst others, 
recruitment, career progression, rights and 
obligations, including the right to earn a monthly 
salary and to be appropriately equipped. It dictates 
that police officers can claim a range of allowances, 
including risk compensation, family and child 
allowances, a monthly housing compensation, 
health care for police personnel and their families, 
indemnity to cover funeral costs, and a range of 
allowances and benefits linked to retirement. The 
law, however, is far from being implemented. 
Nevertheless, the law provides a concrete legal 
framework to improve police employment 
conditions, and makes caring for the police not just 
a moral but a statutory obligation of the state.
Addressing police salaries—currently at around 
USD 60 per month for low-ranking officers—would 
require a major multi-institutional change. Other 
material shortcomings would be easier to address 
with the potential of making a major difference for 
the police’s daily work—for instance by providing 
low-cost equipment such as uniforms and 
stationery on a regular basis. This type of material 
support is not too costly and can be accurately 
budgeted for, while its impact on police satisfaction 
can be measured against control sites. It has a 
considerable potential to improve daily working 
conditions, thereby improving performance and 
popular trust in the police. 
The Inspectorat Générale de la Police (IG, General 
Inspectorate of the Police) could be encouraged to 
take up its mission (amongst others) to monitor 
the distribution of equipment. The aim would be 
to support the police bureau in charge of logistics 
in closely overseeing supply chains and putting in 
place checks and balances to avoid the misuse of 
material supplies. The systematic distribution of 
equipment could also improve low-ranking police 
officers’ trust in the hierarchy and strengthen in-
house logistical capacity. 
Improving living conditions 
When speaking to police officers, some of the 
most-often voiced concerns about their daily lives 
are about health care, housing and taking care of 
their families.
Health
The PNC has established a mutuelle de santé (mutual 
health care fund), to which each salaried police 
officer is obliged to contribute at least CDF 5,000 
(about USD 3) on a monthly basis. In turn, they 
and their families are meant to receive free access 
to health care in dedicated hospitals. According to 
rank-and-file police officers in Bukavu, however, 
the hierarchy seems to have turned the fund into 
yet another revenue source. Their contributions 
do not seem to be invested into hospital staff and 
infrastructure but are siphoned off along the way. 
Ill police officers and their family members do not 
receive effective treatment but are sent to costly 
public hospitals. A police officer described the 
mutual fund as follows: ‘It has become another 
way to extort money from us only to do nothing. 
Because even if one fell ill, you arrive there, you 
just receive three paracetamol pills.’27
Making the mutual health care fund fulfil its 
intended purpose would provide much needed 
social support to police officers and their families, 
and improve their sense of self-worth. This 
could build on the monthly contributions of 
police officers and thus be at least partially self-
funded. Again, the IG could closely monitor the 
fund’s financial flows to safeguard against its 
misuse. Besides this, some police officers argued 
that contributions to this fund should not be 
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obligatory. If the fund does not manage to provide 
the necessary health care, they should be able to 
opt for private insurance instead, such as the one 
offered by the Catholic Church, which only costs 
USD 7 per year.
Housing
A similar approach could be taken for existing 
police camps. The PdP reform encourages 
officers to live among civilians, which many do 
despite the prohibitive rent in urban areas. In 
Bukavu, however, possibly as many pay a fixed 
sum to police camp chiefs in return for rent-free 
accommodation in the camps. Despite these 
payments, camp infrastructure—including water, 
electricity and roads—is very poor to non-existent. 
While police salaries will not increase any time 
soon for them to afford urban rent, ensuring 
decent living space in police camps could be an 
intermediary solution. Development partners could 
work with the police hierarchy and provincial 
government to tender for camp refurbishment. 
This could be co-financed by donors active in 
police reform, and could include the construction 
of medical facilities and schools in the camps, 
managed by the urban administration and 
supported by local NGOs.
Family care
Child care is another repeatedly voiced concern 
of police officers. The cost of food and school fees 
can amount to USD 35 per month per child. To 
relieve this financial burden, police officers largely 
rely on support from social networks, including 
family, friends or their superiors. Others resort to 
loan sharks with exorbitant interest rates or use 
joint solidarity funds called Likilimba. These funds 
unite groups of police officers who each contribute 
a part of their monthly salary. Each month, on a 
rotational basis, the fund is allocated to one of 
the group’s members, allowing the recipient to 
afford larger one-off expenses such as tuition fees, 
large amounts of staple food such as cassava or 
rice, or modest investments in side-businesses. 
The practice of Likilimba, common within certain 
professions and commercial activities across the 
DRC, is a largely informal coping mechanism. At 
least in police circles, it is partly secretive, often 
kept hidden from superiors. 
For those police officers who remain without a 
salary and await joining the payroll, reforms could 
formalize this social support system across the 
police service, sensitizing Likilimba members—
police officers and their spouses—about the best 
use of mutual funds, improving its efficiency 
and possibly linking it to other development 
programmes aimed at boosting small-scale 
economic activity.28 The International Rescue 
Committee (IRC), for example, supports similar 
initiatives with saleswomen in Bukavu’s markets.
For the officers in Bukavu who collect their 
monthly salary from a private bank counter at 
the provincial police headquarters, reforms could 
attempt to institutionalize micro-loan plans at low 
interest rates within these banks. Like Likilimba, 
this would help officers to pay larger one-off 
payments. These types of plans already exist for 
certain types of civil servants. If the interest is 
not paid, the bank can retain a part of the salary. 
This is financially less risky for police officers, 
allowing for better planning and greater economic 
autonomy. 
Finally, the above suggestions may also reduce 
the need to resort to more aggressive revenue 
generating mechanisms in order to fund and 
sustain the police service and supplement income.
Investing in training and mentoring
Recruitment is key for police reform sustainability. 
If newly recruited police are not qualified to meet 
the demands of police work, any reform effort risks 
failing. Only focusing on recruitment, however, is 
not sufficient. Mentoring and training are crucial 
for police officers’ continued motivation and 
performance. It is therefore important to continue 
advising police personnel—particularly station 
chiefs and other commanders—in proximity 
policing principles. Moreover, the coaching system 
could be expanded to non-SSAPR sites. This 
can only be done if former SSAPR coaches are 
supported and additional ones are trained. Coaches 
need transport, stationery and food allowances to 
do their job across their areas of deployment. And 
most importantly, they require dedicated time to 
mentor and train new generations of coaches. 
Within the PNC, the Cellule pour la Réforme de la 
Police (CRP, Police Reform Unit), a unit in charge 
of implementing police reform, could be tasked 
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with reviving the coaching programme. This would 
require significant support, however, as the CRP is 
currently largely under-funded. Nevertheless, the 
CRP formally has the mandate for reform. Donors 
or NGOs could play a key role in advocating for 
the national and provincial police and government 
hierarchy to re-establish the CRP as an institution 
to lead police reform.
Strengthening police–community relations 
Regular communication between local police, 
local administration and citizens builds mutual 
confidence and reliance. This, in turn, can 
improve self-esteem among police officers, 
better performance and increase legitimacy. The 
mechanisms for regular exchange such as the 
FQs and the CLSPs—and, at least for Bukavu, 
experienced personnel at the neighbourhood and 
commune level—are already in place. 
Article 15 of the 2013 decree which institutionalizes 
the CLSP stipulates that the provincial governor 
will establish a so-called Fonds CLSP (CLSP Fund) 
dedicated to its activities. This fund still does not 
exist. At the time of writing, however, civil society 
organizations together with certain members 
of Bukavu’s urban administration are drafting a 
decree for the governor and are advocating for 
its promulgation, which may provide an entry 
point for strategic and financial cooperation from 
international partners.
In the meantime, existing and future donor 
programmes in police reform pilot sites, 
whether they focus on urban governance and 
decentralization, education or health, could work 
with these multi-purpose platforms and their 
personnel, and dedicate some of their funding to 
resume regular monthly meetings. Beyond security, 
this can help identify development priorities and 
coordinate humanitarian interventions. Supporting 
FQs and CLSPs would not only help increase donor 
programmes’ local effectiveness and legitimacy 
but would also maintain a much-needed interface 
between state and society.
The World Bank’s Budget Participatif (Participatory 
Budget) provides an example of the synergies 
between externally funded community-orientated 
programmes and police–community platforms.29 
The project gives neighbourhoods a say in the 
spending of their commune’s budget. On the 
initiative of an experienced commune administrator, 
it was partially used to fund the organization of 
further FQs to discuss security issues, in addition 
to the World Bank programme’s priorities. 
Similar, albeit not legally codified, security and 
police-community exchange platforms such as 
MONUSCO’s Conseil Local de Protection (CLP, Local 
Protection Council) and Search for Common 
Ground’s Tribune d’Expression Populaire (TEP, Popular 
Expression Tribunes), could also redirect their 
funds to support FQs and CLSPs.
Assessing revenue-generating activities 
While the rapportage system exists across the police 
institution, police personnel have different ways 
of dealing with the related pressures of engaging 
in revenue generation. Some of their activities 
are much more harmful to civilians than others. 
Arbitrary arrests, for instance, create more anxiety 
and can be more costly than the fees levied to 
supplement salaries and cover office costs. When 
addressing revenue-generating practices among 
the police, therefore, it is important to gain a 
deeper understanding of which practices severely 
harm civilians, constitute human rights abuses 
and undermine the institution as a whole, and 
those practices which mostly serve as coping 
mechanisms. In the absence of Congolese-driven 
large-scale multi-institutional reform, those 
involved in police reform need to recognize the 
reality that such practices alleviate some of the 
daily pressures on police officers to find means to 
survive.
Conclusion
In recent months and years, the Congolese police 
have gained a questionable reputation for their 
central role in the violent suppression of peaceful 
demonstrations demanding a transfer of power 
following the constitutional end of President 
Kabila’s second mandate on 19 December 2016. 
But further away from the international limelight, 
many PNC officers continue to extract resources 
from those they are meant to protect on a daily 
basis, partly out of necessity.
In the absence of a substantial transformation 
of the DRC’s larger governance framework and 
renewed large-scale donor driven security sector 
reform, modest, locally-driven police reforms 
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can be a more sustainable and financially viable 
way forward. None of the suggested policy 
considerations are silver bullets for these larger, 
structural challenges faced by the reform of the 
police as an institution. Nonetheless, changing the 
police’s everyday behaviour ultimately also requires 
improving living and working conditions of 
ordinary police personnel. Listening to their lived 
experiences and perspectives, thereby deepening 
the understanding of the political economy of 
street-level policing, can yield important insights in 
how to improve reform impact and sustainability, 
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